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ABSTRACT 
 
The second article in a series designed to supplement the introductory financial management 
course, this essay addresses financial statement analysis, including its impact on stock valuation, 
disclosure, and managerial behavior. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
s students embark upon their journey through the first managerial finance course, they too often 
focus on the mechanical aspects of the course and fail to absorb the essential theoretical concepts 
intended to guide those mechanics.  This “missing the forest for the trees” dilemma rings especially 
true when approaching the topic of financial analysis.  Tempted to memorize the ratios for exams, students overlook 
the fact that stockholder wealth maximization (SWM), the risk-return relationship, and agency theory are inextricably 
linked to financial analysis.  Those topics, which formed the basis for part one of this series [Laux, forthcoming], will 
be revisited here as they relate to financial analysis.  In a nutshell, SWM—assumed as the goal of financial 
managers
1—is a function of long-term stock price, and the stock price depends to a great extent on financial reports.  
Analysts employ ratio analysis in arriving at their buy/hold/sell recommendations, and managers consider the effects 
of accounting choice and use disclosure as a method of supplementing required financial reporting, often with agency 
ramifications.  First, the current article reviews financial analysis and couples it with the conceptual challenges for 
managers (including potential agency conflicts).  This coverage is followed by a section devoted to the conceptual 
and empirical literature related to financial analysis, including disclosure. 
 
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS AND MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR 
 
 Textbook presentations of financial analysis devote the bulk of this introduction to the ratios commonly 
generated to judge firm performance, categorizing them as profitability, asset utilization (or “activity”), liquidity, and 
debt utilization (or “leverage”) ratios.  You might choose to briefly review that material, but the purpose here is to 
look at the ratios from the perspectives of stockholder welfare, the risk-return relationship, and managerial behavior 
(or potential misbehavior) as respects agency theory. 
 
 In investigating a firm‟s ability to earn an acceptable return on sales, assets, and equity, analysts look to the 
profitability ratios, all of which depend on reported net income from the income statement and, for the assets and 
equity, reported measures from the balance sheet.  Of course, sales have a direct impact on reported net income.  For 
these measures, typically managers are expected to do most of the following: 
 
 Generate increasing levels of both sales and net income, preferably combined with an increasing percentage 
of net income to sales (indicating an upward trajectory of cost containment—lower expenses per dollar of 
sales); 
 Generate progressively higher income per dollar invested in assets; 
 Generate progressively higher income per dollar of equity. 
 
                                                 
1 See Laux [forthcoming] for the pros and cons of this assumption as outlined in the literature. 
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In the DuPont version of return on equity (which breaks the calculation into profit margin, asset turnover, and 
a leverage component), managers would also be asked to generate more dollars of sales per dollar invested in assets 
and be applauded for incorporating a healthy use of leverage to magnify returns to stockholders.  Thus one of the 
asset utilization ratios, total asset turnover (Sales/Total Assets) and a debt utilization measure provide further analysis 
of the causal factors of return on equity.  Seems simple enough, right?  But financial managers face a number of 
challenges linked to SWM, risk and return, and the principal-agent relationship.  Let‟s review just a few. 
 
 For the profit margin (Net Income/Sales), as noted above, managers are to raise both net income and sales, 
preferably with net income increasing at a faster rate than sales.  Prices are based, in large part, on expectations about 
such things as sales and net income.  When firms fall short of the sales or net income forecasts of analysts, the market 
price of the stock typically suffers.  Thus, in an effort to maximize shareholder wealth as reflected in the stock price, 
managers attempt to ensure that expectations are met.  Often they do so by smoothing sales and income so that, over 
time, projections are easier to make, risk is lowered, and the stock price is maximized.  (This is an example of the 
“maximize return per unit of risk” directive referenced in part one of this series.)  Sometimes this smoothing activity 
leads to questionable practices, such as moving expected sales forward (with special contractual arrangements with 
customers) in years in which sales are falling short, or postponing deliveries and sales recognition in years when sales 
are above expectations.  Of course, the result is a distortion of economic reality (and, occasionally, a breach of 
accounting standards).  Likewise, to contain expenses in a year in which income is falling short of expectations, 
managers can postpone needed maintenance, training sessions, or research and development expenditures— 
discretionary expenses that might be imperative for long-run success.  The result here is to sacrifice long-term wealth 
in favor of short-term stock price maintenance.  As you can see SWM, risk and return, and agency conflicts play 
critical roles in the area of financial analysis.  And we have only covered a single ratio!  To abbreviate this 
discussion, following is a summary of the financial ratios, including the expectations placed on managers, the 
relationship of the ratios to stockholder wealth maximization and risk and return, possible managerial reactions, and 
some potential agency conflicts. 
 
Profitability Ratios 
 
Profit Margin = Net Income/Sales 
 
 Analyst expectations:  Increase net income and sales as well as the net income as a percentage of sales. 
 Relationship to SWM:  The market price of the stock is related to future cash flows, which depend on sales 
and earnings.  Steady sales and net income reduce risk and raise prices. 
 Potential problems and complexities:  Sales and net income are difficult to “control.”  Much of the 
economic decision making is in the hands of customers and suppliers. 
 Possible managerial reactions:  Accounting flexibility, especially in the timing of reporting revenues and 
expenses, can be used to smooth sales and earnings.  Managers can postpone (unwisely) discretionary 
expenditures.  “Within-GAAP” reporting can become fraudulent reporting, wherein economic reality is not 
reflected in the financial statement information. 
 
Return on Assets = Net Income/Total Assets 
 
 Analyst expectations:  Increase net income per dollar invested in assets; reduce the asset base needed to 
generate net income. 
 Relationship to SWM:  A firm‟s ability to generate more income per dollar of assets implies higher 
efficiency and drives up stock prices. 
 Potential problems and complexities:  The asset base required to generate net income is typically measured 
at “book value” (original cost less accumulated depreciation) and can vary with (1) the age of the firm and its 
assets, (2) the depreciation method used, (3) asset revaluation (write-downs), and (4) inflation. 
 Possible managerial reactions:  To reduce the book value of the asset base, managers can use accelerated 
depreciation methods and understate the expected salvage value.  The first might violate the “matching” of 
revenues and expenses, while the latter accelerates the expense and postpones a gain on sale. The choice of 
depreciation method is within GAAP, but managers can run into agency problems when they change 
accounting methods to disguise economic reality.  Managers might write down assets in a bad year to, in 
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effect, get all the bad news out to investors at once (called “big bath” accounting).  This reduces asset values, 
lowers future depreciation expense, magnifies future returns, and distorts economic reality. 
 
Return on Equity = Net Income/Stockholders‟ Equity 
 
 Analyst expectations:  Increase net income per dollar invested by the owners. 
 Relationship to SWM:  A firm‟s ability to generate more income per dollar invested by the owners is viewed 
positively in the marketplace.  However, it can come about either by effective asset utilization (discussed 
below) or the use of leverage (more dollars of assets provided by creditors). 
 Potential problems and complexities:  While leverage can magnify returns to stockholders, it also magnifies 
risk (the risk of default), and overuse can reduce the stock price.  Stockholders‟ equity is a book value 
measure and can differ drastically for old versus new firms, making comparability problematic. 
 Possible managerial reactions:  Managers can be tempted to “play games” with stockholders‟ equity, 
repurchasing stock or using other activities that affect retained earnings (and therefore stockholders‟ equity).  
If managers employ accounting games to manipulate either net income or stockholders‟ equity to buoy up 
current stock prices, this might not be in the long-term best interests of the stockholders. 
 
Asset Utilization Ratios 
 
Receivables Turnover = Sales/Accounts Receivable 
 
 Analyst expectations:  Maximize sales per dollar invested in accounts receivable.  Collect accounts 
receivable quickly, lowering the average outstanding balance and days in the collection period. 
 Relationship to SWM:  Dollars wrapped up in accounts receivable are generating no return, and the risk of 
non-collection rises as days in the collection period rise. 
 Potential problems and complexities:  Harsh collection tactics can cause a firm to lose customers, and 
exceptionally tight credit standards can reduce sales.  Loose standards can lead to uncollectible accounts. 
 Possible managerial reactions:  Managers are sometimes tempted to understate estimated uncollectible 
accounts (to reduce bad debts expense), although this also increases the receivables balance, decreasing the 
turnover ratio.  In addition, they might fail to update credit standards as economic conditions change.  Most 
importantly, managers must constantly fight the temptation to overstate sales (or make sales on credit that 
will not be collected). 
 
Inventory Turnover = Sales/Inventory (or Cost of Goods Sold/Inventory) 
 
 Analyst expectations:  Maximize goods sold (as measured either at retail or cost) per dollar invested in 
inventory.  Minimize the time goods set on the shelf (minimize average dollars in inventory). 
 Relationship to SWM:  Dollars wrapped up in inventory generate no return (and generally have high 
associated costs).  The risk of obsolescence, damage, or theft rises with time on the shelves. 
 Potential problems and complexities:  Inventory costing methods differ (LIFO versus FIFO, for example), 
causing potential problems with comparability.  Harsh sales tactics can cause customers to buy products 
they later return (or fail to pay for), and keeping inventory too low can lead to stock outs. 
 Possible managerial reactions:  Managers are sometimes tempted to use inventory valuation choices to 
disguise fundamental economic problems, and problems similar to those mentioned for receivables turnover 
apply here. 
 
Asset Turnover = Sales/Total Assets 
 
 Analyst expectations:  Increase sales per dollar invested in assets. 
 Relationship to SWM:  A firm‟s ability to generate more sales per dollar of assets implies higher efficiency 
and drives up stock prices. 
 Potential problems and complexities:  The asset base required to generate sales is measured at book value 
(See previous discussion of this dilemma.). 
 Possible managerial reactions:  See “Return on Assets.” 
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Liquidity Ratios 
 
Current Ratio = Current Assets/Current Liabilities 
 
 Analyst expectations:  The higher this ratio, the better able a company should be to pay its bills on time. 
 Relationship to SWM:  A higher ratio indicates greater liquidity, lower risk, and higher stock price. 
 Potential problems and complexities:  If too much of the current assets are in inventory and prepaid 
expenses, a firm might be at risk, since debts must be paid in cash. 
 Possible managerial reactions:  Problems already noted for measuring and controlling both accounts 
receivable and inventory apply here as well. 
 
Quick Ratio = Current Assets less Inventory less Prepaid Expenses/Current Liabilities 
 
 Analyst expectations:  The higher this ratio, the better able a firm is to pay its bills on time.  This is a more 
stringent test than the current ratio, because the less liquid (riskier) assets are removed from the numerator. 
 Relationship to SWM:  The existence of short-term liabilities is riskier than long-term debt because they 
must be paid back sooner (increasing the risk of default).  However, short-term debt is usually cheaper 
(especially free trade credit in the form of accounts payable), driving up return. 
 Potential problems and complexities:  This ratio eliminates some of the problems associated with the current 
ratio.  Still, perfect matching of cash inflows and debt repayment can be challenging. 
 Possible managerial reactions:  Managers may take advantage of the free credit extended by suppliers; if the 
firm delays payments unduly, this could damage supplier relationships, ultimately undermining the 
long-term wealth of the firm and its stockholders. 
 
Debt Utilization Ratios 
 
Debt to Assets Ratio = Total Liabilities/Total Assets 
 
 Analyst expectations:  This percentage, representing the amount of debt per dollar of assets, is typically 
compared with industry norms to determine acceptability. 
 Relationship to SWM:  The higher this ratio, the more leverage and the greater risk.  The potential return 
lies in the firm‟s ability to generate higher returns on the portion provided by creditors than the cost of this 
debt. 
 Potential problems and complexities:  The liability value may be close to a true market value (the amount 
required to eliminate the debt), while the asset base is at book value (See previous discussion.).  Thus a 
newer firm with essentially the same physical asset base might show a lower debt ratio than an older firm 
with depreciated asset values. 
 Possible managerial reactions:  Financial managers must judge whether the relative amount of debt is 
judicious and will time debt issuance to occur during favorable markets for debt.  Equity issuance typically 
dampens earnings per share and stock prices, so managers sometimes tend to avoid such issuance.  In 
addition, managers have been known to participate in “off-balance sheet financing” in which they construct 
lease agreements to avoid classifying them as capital leases (showing both an asset and a liability on the 
balance sheet); the result is an understated debt-to-assets ratio that does not reflect economic reality.  Other 
risk-taking/risk-avoidance behaviors are discussed in later articles on leverage and capital structure. 
 
Times Interest Earned = Operating Income*/Interest Expense (*Income before interest and taxes) 
 
Fixed Charge Coverage Ratio = Operating Income +Lease Payments/Fixed Charges (including interest and leases) 
 
 Analyst expectations:  The higher the coverage numbers the better for investors.  They indicate the number 
of times operating income could pay interest expense and total fixed charges. 
 Relationship to SWM:  Higher numbers indicate less risk of defaulting on interest payments to creditors and 
required payments to leaseholders, and this is valued positively by the market. 
American Journal of Business Education – March 2010 Volume 3, Number 3 
85 
 Potential problems and complexities:  If a company is generating high profits but low cash flows from 
operations, these numbers can be misleading, not reflective of economic reality; interest and lease 
requirements can only be paid with cash. 
 Possible managerial reactions:  Any actions that artificially inflate operating income will also overstate the 
interest and fixed charge coverage ratios. 
 
Market-Based Ratios 
 
Earnings per Share = Net Income less Preferred Dividends/Average number of Common Shares Outstanding 
 
 Analyst expectations:  Perhaps the most influential measure for setting stock prices, the EPS is expected to 
meet expectations; investors want it to be high and to grow over time. 
 Relationship to SWM:  A smooth, upward trajectory for EPS reduces risk and increases share price.  
Managers focus (perhaps too much) on making this happen. 
 Potential problems and complexities:  Any cautions previously noted about net income and earnings 
manipulation apply here.  Also, treasury stock transactions affect the number of shares outstanding. 
 Possible managerial reactions:  Because meeting EPS expectations is considered so paramount to 
maximizing the stock price, managers are tempted to smooth income, engage in treasury stock transactions, 
and employ voluntary disclosure (to influence analyst expectations) to make this a reality. 
 
Price-Earnings Ratio = Market Price per Share/EPS 
 
 Analyst expectations:  The “multiple” the market places on a firm‟s earnings, this ratio reflects investor 
optimism about the firm‟s future; the higher, the more optimistic investors are about the firm‟s ability to 
generate earnings into the future. 
 Relationship to SWM:  If investors are optimistic about the firm‟s future earnings prospects, this ratio will 
be higher than the industry average.  If it grows over time, this indicates the market‟s enthusiasm for 
managerial actions. 
 Potential problems and complexities:  If the EPS are falling, this ratio can become inflated and not represent 
true optimism about the firm‟s prospects. 
 Possible managerial reactions:  The tactics associated with meeting EPS expectations apply here. 
 
Dividend Yield = Dividends per Share/Market Price per Share 
 
 Analyst expectations:  For dividend-paying companies, investors want to see this number high and growing, 
because it is a measure of return on invested dollars. 
 Relationship to SWM:  One of the two returns associated with stock ownership (the other being stock price 
appreciation), dividends represent a cash flow that helps determine the stock price.  The steadier this cash 
flow over time, the better, because risk is reduced, expected return is reduced, and the stock price rises. 
 Potential problems and complexities:  Not all investors want dividend income; some prefer market price 
appreciation.  Theory suggests investors should seek out firms that align with their interests.  Also, in 
theory, managers should reinvest income in all positive net present value projects, paying dividends only 
when they cannot find acceptable projects. 
 Possible managerial reactions:  Sometimes managers will retain earnings even when they lack sufficiently 
profitable projects (those that return greater than the weighted average cost of capital).  While this might 
buoy up current income, it destroys long-term wealth. 
 
Note that this analysis is abbreviated, and the articles to follow in this series will elaborate on these items.  
For now, this offers a simple overview linking financial analysis with SWM, risk and return, and managerial behavior.  
For an enjoyable pre-Sarbanes-Oxley review of financial analysis, Understanding the Corporate Annual Report: 
Nuts, Bolts and a Few Loose Screws [2003] is a must read.  It offers a succinct summary of financial statements and 
ratios while pointing out the red flags that might help analysts detect earnings manipulation and fraudulent reporting.  
For the financial manager, it might offer a financial statement user‟s perspective on what‟s confusing, what‟s 
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enlightening, and what‟s so darned irritating about financial managers‟ attempts to magnify the good and downplay 
(or even hide) the bad.  Textbooks present financial analysis from the perspective of the financial manager whose 
objectives are to outperform the competition and attract capital to the firm.  The next section introduces some of the 
research associated with financial analysis and corporate disclosure. 
 
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS IN THE LITERATURE 
 
 The literature on financial analysis addresses two primary questions:  (1) How does the analysis of 
information in financial statements influence stock prices?  (2) How does disclosure affect users‟ decisions?  The 
research on these questions is massive, and the current article will touch on some of the most widely cited and on some 
of the more contemporary articles. 
 
 On the question of relevance to stock prices, Francis and Schipper [1999] show that earnings relevance has 
decreased over time, but certain balance sheet information (specifically, the book value of asset and liabilities) has 
shown little degradation.  Kim and Kross [2005] find that the ability of earnings to predict operating cash flows 
(rather than stock prices) has increased over time.  Cooper et al. [2005] contend that common investing mechanisms 
that rely on financial statement information do not predict future returns well, ex ante.  Barber et al. [2001] also find 
that, after transactions costs, no profit can be made from investing based on analysts‟ recommendations.  On the 
contrary, several studies find effectiveness in models founded on financial statement analysis, including Hirshleifer et 
al. [2004] who discover predictive value in net operating assets (a negative relationship with future stock returns).  
Similarly, Mohanram [2005] separates winners from losers among low book-to-market value firms using a 
self-designed “GSCORE” that relies on financial analysis.  This article (on pp. 135-137) also offers a superb and brief 
review of the literature devoted to the book-to-market effect and fundamental analysis, which relies heavily on 
financial statement information.  Piotroski [2000] uses historical financial information to generate an investing 
strategy to buy winners and short losers among high book-to-market firms.  His “composite score” is a function of 
nine variables—four related to profitability, three to leverage and liquidity, and two to operating efficiency.  Nissim 
and Penman [2001] use financial ratios related to operating activities (profitability) and financing activities (growth) 
to predict future equity payoff.  Several studies concentrate on the usefulness of one popular ratio, the price-earnings 
(P/E) ratio, in predicting future prices.  Both Bhargava and Malhatra [2006] and Jones [2008] find that the P/E ratio 
fails as a good predictor of future prices; the latter study finds that earnings growth is important, however.  Thus, this 
brief review of literature offers the financial manager some insight into what information “cues” are read and acted 
upon in the market by investors. 
 
 Healy and Palepu [2001] offer the single most comprehensive review of the empirical disclosure literature, 
dividing the coverage into four areas:  Regulation of disclosure (Summary: “regulated financial reports provide new 
and relevant information to investors,” p. 413); auditing and disclosure (Summary:  there is not much research on 
whether auditors “enhance the credibility of financial statements,” p. 415); managers‟ disclosure decisions (Summary:  
“evidence indicates that financial analysts add value in the capital market…[but] there is also evidence of analyst 
bias,” pp. 416 and 417); capital market consequences of disclosure (Summary:  voluntary disclosure theories and 
evidence vary, and many measurement problems exist, p. 429).  In short, this article captures the essence of the 
empirical studies and categorizes the literature in a meaningful way. 
 
 Questions surrounding disclosure have led to a number of articles, some related to the voluntary disclosure of 
good news versus bad, and others looking more generally at whether investors find disclosure helpful.  Skinner 
[1994] hypothesizes that bad news will be disclosed on a quarterly basis (both to defuse possible litigation and to 
preserve reputation) but that good news will correspond to annual earnings announcements.  In Lang and Lundholm‟s 
1996 study, “Corporate Disclosure Policy and Analyst Behavior,” the authors discover that disclosure increases 
analyst coverage, generates better forecasts, and decreases both dispersion and volatility in forecasts.  Similarly, the 
much cited “Bringing the Future Forward:  The Effect of Disclosure on the Returns-Earnings Relation,” [Lundholm 
and Myers, 2002] suggests that “increased disclosure activity „brings the future forward‟ into current stock returns…” 
(p. 810).  The authors speculate that disclosure is “filling the gap” created by accounting earnings information that 
falters in the information economy.  The worth of CEO/CFO certification of financial statements is investigated in 
Chang et al. [2006, p. 1] with two findings:  “the certification provides assurance to investors by making disclosure 
more credible and by reducing information asymmetry between owners and management, and [this] is reflected in the 
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stock price of the certifying company.”   Finally, Gelb and Zarowin [2002] contend that “greater disclosure is 
associated with stock prices that are more informative about future earnings [and thus] greater disclosure provides 
information benefits to investors” (p. 33).  This research suggests that the investing public appreciates and responds 
to information disclosure that goes beyond that provided by traditional accounting reports.  This is important to 
financial managers who must weigh the cost of providing such information against the potential benefit gained.  
Disclosure also bears risk—the risk of misinterpretation, for example.  In addition, the information aspect becomes a 
new competitive item for financial managers; those who fall short of their competitors in the area of disclosure will 
also fall short of stockholder wealth maximization. 
 
This Series Continues 
 
 As this article has shown, stockholder wealth maximization, risk and return, and the market‟s response to 
financial information (including the implications for future cash flows) influence the behavior of the financial 
manager.  The next article investigates the use of various types of leverage, again concentrating on the connections to 
stockholder welfare, risk and return, and managerial behavior. 
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